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NATURE OF CASE 
This case involves an application to the Public Service 
Commission of Utah for its approval of the purchase by two 
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passenger motor carriers of the stock of a third passenger 
motor carrier, 
DISPOSITION BY PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
The Public Service Commission approved the stock purchase 
and granted the application. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW 
•" • • • • • • ' < mi • ' •!' in m • •' ' H I H H ; • • • i n 
Plaintiffs seek to have the findings and order of the 
Public Service Commission set aside on the grounds that they 
are unlawful, arbitrary and capricious, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For simplification, herein the Public Service Commission 
of Utah shall be referred to as "Commission", the defendants 
Utah Valley Transit, Cook Transportation Company and Lake 
Shore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. shall be respectively referred 
to as "Valley", "Cook" and "Lake Shore", and the plaintiffs 
Greyhound Lines, Inc., Continental Bus System, Inc., American 
Bus Lines, Inc., Denver-Salt Lake-Pacific Stages, Inc. and 
Lewis Bros. Stages, Inc. shall be respectively referred to 
as "Greyhound", "Continental", "American", "Denver-Salt Lake" 
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and "Lewis." The Utah Transit Authority shall be referred 
to herein as "UTA," 
As pertinent to this proceeding, Valley holds authority 
from the Commission to originate charter operations at Provo 
and at points between Santaquin and Springville, Utah, all 
in Utah County (T. 2951, It has no interstate charter authority. 
Cook has intrastate authority to originate charter trips 
at points in Cache County and it has interstate authority 
to originate charters at Logan, Brigham City and Ogden 
with destinations restricted to specific areas in the western 
United States (T. 298). Lake Shore holds both intrastate 
and interstate authority to operate charter round trips 
"originating on the routes now served by applicant in its 
regular common carrier operations within the state of Utah." 
Lake Shore's regular route operations extend between Salt 
Lake City and Ogden (T. 299). 
Greyhound and American hold intrastate and interstate 
authority to originate charters at Salt Lake City, Ogden 
and intermediate points and Continental, Denver-Salt Lake 
and Lewis each hold authority to originate charters at 
Salt Lake City (T. 3 84). 
-4~ 
By their Petition filed with the Commission, Valley and. 
Cook each sought to acquire fifty percent (50%) of the stock 
of Lake Shore (T. 1061t Such approval is required by Section 
54-4-29, Utah Code Annotated, 1954. The Petition was assigned 
to hearing as Investigation and Suspension Docket No* 172 
inasmuch as Cook, Valley and Lake Shore had entered into 
other contracts with UTA by which certain authority of Lake 
Shore had been sold to UTA (T. 12-13). 
Following the death in 1972 of John Yeaman, owner of 
all of the Lake Shore stock, the administrator of his estate 
entered into an agreement to sell to UTA the bulk of the 
assets, including the regular route operating rights, of 
Lake Shore (Exhibit 13, T. 275), Since UTA would not pay 
anything for the Lake Shore charter rights, the sale was 
made subject to the following provision (T. 159-160): 
11, Buyer agrees that it will cooperate 
with the seller in preserving the seller's right 
to operate minimal regular route operations 
necessary to retain the charter rights of Lake 
Shore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. and in transferring 
same to a third purchaser. Regular route service 
necessary to retain said charter rights shall be 
performed by the seller or its successor in interest 
at a time and date not to compete with buyer's 
operation and service. (Emphasis added.) (T. 278.) 
^5-
Schedule VII attached to the agreement listed as 
"rights to be retained by sellers'1: 
* * * 
2. Intrastate charter rights of Lake Shore 
(originating in Salt Lake, Davis and Weber Counties). 
3. Interstate charter rights of Lake Shore 
(ICC charter rights). 
4. Right to operate minimal regular route 
operations to a degree necessary to retain charter 
rights under Section 208 (c) , (Estimated at one 
route per month. Service to be performed at a 
time and date not to compete with buyer's operation 
and service.) (T. 281,1 
* * * 
After the sale to UTA was consummated, Mr. Yeaman's 
administrator then sought to sell Lake Shore charter rights 
to Valley and Cook. Negotiations resulted in an agreement 
of terms between Valley, Cook and UTA which were set forth 
in a letter dated April 15, 1974 and signed by the parties 
(Exhibit 12, T. 53-54, 273). Among those terms were the 
following: 
3. UTA, Cook and Valley agree that they shall 
make a joint application to the Public Service 
Commission of Utah seeking approval of the 
following: 
(a) Permission for Cook and Valley to 
purchase the stock of Lake Shore. 
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(b) Revision of Public Service Commission 
Certificate No. 288 to provide that Lake Shore 
will operate only one bus on one route between 
Salt Lake and Ogden and return trip to Ogden, 
with services limited to Sunday only. 
(c) UTA acknowledges and agrees that 
because of the service which UTA will render 
between Ogden and Salt Lake City, that the 
operation only on Sunday by Lake Shore will 
constitute adequate service to the public on 
a continuous basis. 
Nothing in the above shall be construed as limiting 
the rights of UTA to operate between Ogden and Salt Lake 
City on Sunday or on any other day. (T. 274
 #) 
By their Petition to the Commission for approval of their 
purchase of the Lake Shore stock, Valley and Cook represented: 
4. That Cook and Valley have entered into an 
agreement with the Utah Transit Authority, hereafter, 
referred to as U.T.A., which would require the revision 
of Certificate #288 to limit the regular route 
authority to one round trip on Sunday which would 
be scheduled to serve the students at the Ogden 
School for the Blind, and the Ogden School for 
the Deaf and that the U.T.A. would serve the remaining 
part of Certificate #288, (T. 358.) 
Following hearings on said Petitions and submissions of 
legal memoranda by the parties, the Commission issued its 
Report and Order wherein it failed to address itself to the 
legal issues raised by the parties in their memoranda except 
to simply state Mlsplitting1 of the Lake Shore authority in 
the manner proposed in the instant application will not 
«p*y*-* 
result in the creation of any new transportation authority. • •" 
The Commission simply concluded that approval of the application 
would be in the public interest and it ordered that the 
purchase of Lake Shore stock by Valley and Cook be approved 
(T. 385). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE COMMISSION'S ORDER IS UNLAWFUL, 
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS SINCE IT IN EFFECT ALLOWS 
THREE CARRIERS TO CONDUCT CERTAIN CHARTER OPERATIONS 
WHILE ONLY ONE CARRIER HAS APPLIED FOR AND RECEIVED 
A CERTIFICATE AUTHORIZING SUCH OPERATIONS. 
The scheme of governmental regulation of public motor 
carriers in Utah established by statute prohibits entry 
of a new carrier into a competitive market without first 
applying for and receiving a certificate based upon proof 
of public convenience and necessity. Such a requirement 
is established by Section 54-6-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
It provides in part: 
It shall be unlawful for any common motor 
carrier to operate as a carrier in intrastate 
commerce within this state without first having 
obtained from the Commission a certificate of 
convenience and necessity. * * * If the 
Commission finds from the evidence that the 
public convenience and necessity require the 
proposed service or any part thereof, it may 
issue the certificate as prayed for or issue 
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it for the partial exercise only of the privilege 
sought, and may attach to the exercise of the 
right granted by such certificate such terms and 
conditions as in its judgment the public convenience 
and necessity may require, otherwise such certificate 
shall be denied. 
In the instant case, the Commission order was not based 
upon any showing of public convenience and necessity. In 
fact, the Commission accepted the position taken by the 
applicants that approval of the application did not require 
a showing of public convenience and necessity (T. 34, 101). 
However, the effect of the Commission's order in this case, 
which allows Valley and Cook to purchase and control Lake 
Shore, is to create in all three of those carriers the 
ability to do and profit from what only Lake Shore was 
authorized to do before. Such has the practical effect 
of bypassing the mandate of the statute by establishing 
new authority and new competition without requiring a showing 
of public convenience and necessity. 
If the Commission's order is allowed to stand, Valley, 
Cook and Lake Shore will each be in a position to solicit, 
conduct and profit from the intrastate and interstate charter 
operations which originate at Salt Lake City, Ogden and all 
-9~ 
intermediate points. Such will be accomplished through a 
combination of CD control of Lake Shore by both Valley 
and Cook, (2) the practice of conducting Lake Shore charters 
with Valley and Cook buses and drivers through the use of 
trip leases, and (3) the distribution of Lake Shore profits 
resulting from those leases to Valley and Cook, 
By way of example, if the Commission order is affirmed, 
Valley, a carrier which has no authority to originate charters 
in Salt Lake City, Ogden and intermediate points, is placed 
in a position whereby it can solicit such charters. When 
such a charter is obtained, it is registered under the name 
of Lake Shore. Then Valley and Lake Shore (through Mr, 
Hardman who is president of both companies) execute a lease 
under which Valley leases its bus and driver to Lake Shore 
and the charter is then operated in Valley equipment, driven 
by Valley's driver and conducted under Valley's complete 
control. Revenue from the charter is then funneled through 
Lake Shore's books but paid to Valley, less a commission 
paid to Lake Shore* The Lake Shore commission, however, as 
a Lake Shore profit, is then distributed back to Valley 
in the form of a dividend. Of course, the same manipulation 
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of equipment and authority is available to Cook, 
The actual control of all of Lake Shore's operations 
by both Valley and Cook is not in question. Besides each 
having fifty percent (50%} of the Lake Shore stock, Harry T. 
Hardman, the president of Valley, is also to be the president 
of Lake Shore (T. 16} and J, Vernon Cook, president and 
general manager of Cook, is to be Lake Shore's chairman 
of the board CT. 104, 106}. 
The above-cited example of an operation of charters 
by Valley and Cook in the Lake Shore territory through 
the use of equipment-driver leases is not just theoretical. 
It is and has been a common practice. The details of that 
practice were explained in the testimony of Mr. Hardman under 
cross-examination (T. 59-67). Under such lease arrangements, 
revenue from leases using Valley equipment and drivers has 
been collected by Lake Shore and then remitted to Valley 
after deducting a commission. Mr, Hardman admitted that 
such charters were under Valley's full control and that 
• he intended to continue that same method of operation after 
approval of this application by the Commission (T. 62, 66-67). 
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This effective creation of new authority by contract 
rather than by the presentation of evidence of a need for 
new authority is an activity which has already been 
determined by the Interstate Commerce Commission to be 
absolutely prohibited. In fact, the practice of disallowing 
such transactions has now been codified in the ICC regulations 
involving "Transfer Of Motor Operating Rights/1 Section 
1132.5(a) states, in part: 
Division of Rights. 
An application for transfer for part of 
an operating right as to routes or commodities 
will be denied if it is found that [it] (1) 
would create duplicating rights as defined in 
Section 1132.1(c)1 . . , [and] (2) would divide 
the rights at a point other than along clearly 
defined geographical or political lines, or 
permit a minute and multiple division of 
operating rights so that numerous carriers 
might ultimately operate under rights initially 
granted as a unit . . . (Emphasis added.) 
49 C.F.R. 1132.5(a). 
Exhaustive research has revealed absolutely no instance 
in which the Interstate Commerce Commission or the courts 
have allowed two carriers to acquire the control of the 
^Section 1132.1(c): Duplicating Rights. 
"Operating rights which authorize the 
transportation of passengers, or of 
the same commodities, from and to, 
or between the same points." 
49 C.F.R. 1132.1(c), 
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separate and different operating rights of a third carrier 
without additional proof of public convenience and necessity. 
There is no Utah law on the subject. 
The reason for the above firmly-established rule 
relating to carrier combinations is obvious. It is designed 
to avoid the creation of new authority by contract (i.e,, 
stock purchase) rather than by proof of need since the creation 
of new and duplicating authority increases the competitive 
effect on existing carriers and can only be deemed to be in 
the public interest if a need for additional competition 
is shown through proof of the inadequacy of the other existing 
services, A discussion of this rationale is found in the 
leading case of H. P. Welch Co, - Purchase - E, J, Scannell, 
Inc, , 25 M,C,C. 558, 1 F,C.C. 1(7385 (1939). Other cases 
cited at C.C.H. Federal Carriers Reporter, Volume 1, 1(204, 
POINT II: THE COMMISSION' S ORDER SHOULD BE 
SET ASIDE SINCE IT APPROVES AN UNLAWFUL DIVISION 
AND SALE OF A PORTION OF THE OPERATIONS AUTHORIZED 
BY LAKE SHORE'S CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE 
AND NECESSITY. 
The agreement between Lake Shore and UTA pursuant to 
which Valley and Cook intend to conduct Lake Shore operations 
is unlawful and against public policy for at least four 
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reasons: CD it attempts to illegally sever Lake Shore's 
incidental charter rights from its basic regular route 
authority; (2\ it attempts to unlawfully split Lake Shorefs 
regular route authority between Lake Shore and UTA; (3) it 
constitutes an agreement by Lake Shore to limit its services 
to the public; and (41 it, together with the evidence of 
record, demonstrates an intent by Lake Shore not to engage 
in a bona fide regular route service. 
It is clear from the record that the real purpose behind 
the terms of the various agreements between Lake Shore, UTA, 
Valley and Cook is to allow Lake Shore to sever its regular 
route authority from its charter authority and then sell the 
regular route authority to UTA and sell its charter authority 
to Valley and Cook. Mr, Peterson, representing the estate of 
John Yeaman, explained that the terms of the administrator's 
agreement with UTA (Exhibit 13, T. 275) arose because UTA 
would not pay anything for the Lake Shore charter rights 
(T. 159-160). Likewise, Mr. Hardman's testimony shows that 
the real purpose of the purchase of Lake Shore stock by 
Valley and Cook, in light of the contract with UTA, was 
to obtain the Lake Shore charter rights (T. 32-33). Thus, 
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the parties agreed that Lake Shore would perform "minimal 
regular route operations necessary to retain the charter 
rights of Lake Shore, . . ," (Exhibit 13, T, 278}. 
However, charter operations by regular route bus lines 
have been traditionally authorized as incidental to the 
regular route service, without requiring proof of convenience 
and necessity. Such incidental charter authorities issued 
to regular route passenger carriers are traditionally 
described as authorizing charters originating at points on 
the route served by the carrier in its regular route operations. 
Thus, as in this case, Lake Shore's charter authority is 
described as "charter round trips originating on the routes 
now served by applicant in its regular common carrier 
operations within the state of Utah" (T. 299), Lake Shore 
recognized the incidental nature of its charter authority 
as evidenced by its agreement with UTA which provides for 
Lake Shore to retain sufficient scheduled service so as to 
retain the charter authority. 
The granting of incidental charter authority has obviously 
been for the purpose of providing regular route carriers with 
the opportunity to more efficiently use their bus equipment 
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and as a source of additional revenue so as to enhance the 
stability and economy of the regular route services. It was 
never intended that the incidental charter operations should 
be primary and the regular route service secondary, as 
Lake Shore now attempts to treat them. 
It was established early in the history of motor carrier 
regulations that, when charter authority is issued as incidental 
to regular route service, such charter authority may not be 
severed from the regular route authority in an attempt to 
sell one or the other. Such was established by the Interstate 
Commerce Commission in 19 42 in the case of Menzo M. Liederbachf 
41 M.C.C. 595, 3 F.C.C. 1(30,500. There the Commission 
explained: 
In Regulations, Special or Chartered Party 
Service, 29 M.C.C. 25, Division 5 also found 
that Section 20 8(c) of the Act is not a limita-
tion upon any rights authorized by Sections 206(a) 
or 207 of the j\ctf but confers an additional right, 
without proof, which is not severable, to carriers 
operating over a regular route or routes and 
between fixed termini, except carriers performing, 
either exclusively or in connection with other 
certified rights, special or charter operations 
under a certificate authorizing such operations 
over regular or irregular routes within a fixed 
territory. Clearly, therefore, since the chartered 
party operations conducted by applicant, within the 
territory served by his regular route operation, 
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are not severable from the latter operation, that 
part of the above-described agreement on June 2 5, 
1936, which purports to reserve for applicant the 
special or chartered party operations, and the 
so-called Quit-Claim Deed from Northland to applicant 
are without legal effect* We conclude, therefore 
that the transfer and sale by applicant of his 
regular-route passenger operation to Northland, 
despite the reservations above quoted, carried 
with it all rights applicant held by virtue of 
Section 208(c) of the Act, (Emphasis added,) 
Pages 601-602. 
It should be noted that the principles established by 
the Liederbach case have never been changed. In essence, 
it has been consistently required that any carrier wishing 
to compete on charter service with regular route carriers 
holding incidental charter authority must either hold and 
operate such authority as an incident to their own bona 
fide regular route service or must apply for and prove that 
that public convenience and necessity requires the issuance 
of additional charter authority. 
In the recent case of Estacada - Molalla Stages, Inc, v. 
United States, P. Supp. ^  , 1974 F.C.C, 1f82, 475, 
the court reviewed and affirmed a decision by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission involving a fact situation 
very similar to that of the instant case. There, as here, 
a bus line which was authorized to operate both interstate 
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and intrastate bus passenger service over a particular regular 
route sold the intrastate operations to a public transit 
authority, ceased operation of the interstate regular route 
service and then sought to transfer its charter operation to 
a separate company. The Interstate Commerce Commission had 
found that the incidental charter rights were not severable 
from the regular route authority and it then cancelled the 
carrier's regular route authority for failure to operate it, 
thus nullifying the carrier's charter authority. In affirming 
the Commission's action, the court agreed that the carrier's 
incidental charter rights were "not to be severable from 
the underlying regular route certificate and to be viable 
only when regular service is maintained," 
Lake Shore's sale of its regular route authority to UTA 
also involved an unlawful split of its regular route authority. 
Lake Shore sold to UTA its regular route authority to the extent 
of any and all schedules which UTA wishes to operate. While 
initially it was contemplated that UTA would only operate 
schedules Monday through Saturday, it was understood and 
provided that UTA would have the right to operate on "Sunday 
or on any other day" and that any schedules to be operated 
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by Lake Shore would be done at "a time and date not to compete 
with [UTAfs] operation and service" (T, 274, 278; Exhibits 12 
and 13}. Mr. Oswald, the witness for UTA, made it clear that 
UTA does intend to provide Sunday service in the future. 
He testified: 
At the present time the reason we don't operate 
on Sundays and holidays is that we don't have the 
funds to do it. If the voters approve the referendum 
in November I assure you that the future plans provide 
for Sunday service. (T. 183.) 
On the other hand, Lake Shore also attempted to reserve 
to itself an indeterminable quantity of regular route authority 
. • • just enough to enable it to retain its charter rights 
• .
 t whatever that is. Such, however, is an attempted 
splitting and manipulation of rights which has consistently 
been prohibited. The leading case in this respect is H. 
P. Welch Company - Purchase - E. J. Scannell, Inc., 25 M.C.C. 
558, 1 F.C.C. 1(7385 (1939), in which the Interstate Commerce 
Commission specifically addressed itself to an attempted 
splitting of bus authority by a dividing of bus schedules. 
•The Interstate Commerce Commission, in disallowing such a 
split, concluded: 
. . . If we should permit such splitting under 
Section 213, and hence without regard to convenience 
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and necessity, we would be thereby failing to 
properly perform one of our duties under the act, 
and, in lieu thereof, in effect would be permitting 
the creation by the direct parties to the transaction 
of new rights by contract and without regard to 
public convenience and necessity. (Emphasis added.) 
Page 564. 
The Welch case has been cited by the ICC and the courts more 
than a hundred times in subsequent cases involving the 
attempted split of authority in one way or another, but 
the doctrine prohibiting such a splitting of authority 
without proof of convenience and necessity still stands. 
Thus, Lake Shore's attempt to sell to UTA a quantity of 
its regular route schedules operating between Salt Lake 
City and Ogden and yet, at the same time, to retain to itself 
another quantity of said schedules, constitutes what has 
always been viewed as a transaction which is in violation 
of the regulatory scheme and thus illegal and against public 
policy. In this instance, the transaction is even more 
repugnant to public policy inasmuch as the schedules to 
be sold and to be retained are not determinable. 
The limitations contained in the agreement between 
Lake Shore and UTA are also illegal and against public 
policy, since Lake Shore thereby agrees to limit its 
schedules operated pursuant to the regular route authority 
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to times and places not to conflict with schedules which 
UTA may, in its discretion, operate. Lake Shore has agreed 
to conduct ". . . minimal regular route operations . . ." 
(T. 278) . Agreements to refrain from or limit services 
authorized by a grant of authority are unenforceable since 
carriers are obliged to provide all of the services which 
they are authorized to render and cannot agree among them-
selves to cease or limit such services. See Glendenning 
Motor Ways, Inc., 65 M,C,Ct 614 (1956). 
Finally, it is obvious from the record that the one 
Sunday schedule which Valley and Cook intend to have Lake 
Shore operate in an effort to retain incidental charter 
rights is only a device conceived by the carriers so as to 
retain those charter rights and as Sunday service is 
instituted by UTA as promised by Mr. Oswald, there will 
simply be no need for any schedule to be operated by Lake 
Shore. Thus, the proposed Lake Shore Sunday schedule is 
not a bona fide operation of the regular route authority 
and it is clear under federal regulatory law that Lake 
Shore's authority cannot be transferred to Valley and Cook 
under those circumstances. 49 C.F.R., Section 1132.5(c) 
provides: 
-21-
Purpose of Transfer, 
A proposed transfer of operating rights will 
not be approved if the Commission finds that the 
transferee does not intend to, or would not, 
engage in bona fide motor carrier operations 
under such operating rights , , . 
CONCLUSION 
The scheme of regulation for motor carriers as adopted 
by the Utah Legislature clearly contemplates that carriers 
shall only be allowed to operate particular services which 
are assigned to them by their respective certificates of 
convenience and necessity and that any competitive operation 
outside the assigned authority is prohibited. New competitive 
operations may only be instituted by application and by 
proof of public convenience and necessity. Section 54-6-5, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
To facilitate enforcement of such regulation, the 
Legislature has wisely granted the Commission various powers 
which include, in part, the authority to scrutinize mergers, 
stock transfers and asset purchases, leases, etc, as between 
.the certified utilities so as to prohibit a manipulation of 
authorities and operations which would violate the scope 
of the authorities granted and the competitive balance 
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established thereby. Section 54-4-28, 29 and 30, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953. 
Over many years of similar carrier regulation by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, certain principles have been 
carefully established concerning the types of inter-carrier 
business transactions which are acceptable or prohibited 
so as to properly maintain the regulatory plan. Among those 
practices which have become firmly prohibited, at least 
without proof of a need for additional service, are; (1) 
control through stock transfer of one regulated carrier by 
two or more other regulated carriers in those cases where 
such control would, in effect, result in a split of an 
authority; (2) the splitting of an authority through sale 
or lease on a basis other than along clearly defined 
geographical lines, i.e., splitting of bus service by schedule; 
(3) the separation of charter authority from the regular 
route authority to which the charter authority was granted 
as an incidental privilege; (4) agreements by carriers to 
•limit the service which they will offer to the public; and 
(5) transfers of authority by sale of stock or otherwise 
when the transferee does not intend to engage in a bona fide 
operation of such authority to the full extent authorized. 
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In the instant case, each of the above five practices 
are contemplated and if this court were to affirm the order 
of the Commission the whole purpose and concept of carrier 
regulation would be undermined and Utah would find itself 
at complete odds with well-reasoned and firmly-established 
principles of carrier regulation as established by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission and adopted by the various 
states. Plaintiff urges the court to carefully review the 
action of the Commission in this case and then set aside the 
Commission order as being unlawful, arbitrary and capricious. 
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